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INTRODUCTION
Until  fairly  recently,  most  economists  have  viewed  the  household
as  a  collection  of  individuals  who  behave  as  if  they  are  in  agreement
on  how  best  to  combine  time,  goods  purchased  in  the  market,  and  goods
produced  at  home,  to  produce  commodities  (sometimes  referred  to  as
'Z-goods')  that  maximi7e  some  common  welfare  index.  This  model  has
been  extended  far  beyond  standard  demand  analysis  to  include  the
determinants  of  education,  health,  fertility,  child  fostering,
migration,  labor  supply,  home  production,  land  tenure,  and  crop
adoption.
This  approach,  which  we  call  the  unitary  model,  is  appealing
because  of  the  relative  simplicity  of  comparative  statics  generated
and  the  diversity  of  issues  it  can  address.  Moreover,  it  is  not
inconsistent  with  differences  in  individual  welfare  within  a
household,  even  when  these  differences  are  exhibited  systematically  by
some  gender,  age,  or  relation  to  household  head  grouping.  Why,  then,
should  questions  arise  about  its  use? This  paper,  drawing  on  a  wide
rdnge  of  literature  thdt  has  developed  in  the  last  10  years,  argues
that  the  unitary  household  model  has  two  weaknesses:  (a)  its3  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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thecretical  foundations  are  restrictive,  and  (b)  it  has  been
empirically  refuted  in  a  number  of  settings.
The  weaknesses  are  not  merely  academic,  they  have  important
policy  implications.  First,  the  unitary  model  implies  t;iat  it  does
not  matter  to  whom  policy  initiatives  are  directed:  given  information
sharing,  the  response  to  that  policy  will  be  recipient-independent.
This  focus  on  only  one  or  two  economic  agents  within  the  household  has
led  to  both  policy  non-adoption  and  the  generation  of  unintended
adverse  impacts  from  policy  adoption.  Second,  the  unitary  model
depicts  as  impotent  a  number  of  policy  initiatives  which  do  not
directly  affect  the  technology  of  Z-good  production  and  do  not  affect
household  preferences.  In  other  words,  the  unitary  model  can  le- to
policy  failures  which  reflect  a  failure  to  understand  the  long  reach
of  some  public  interventions.  Examples  are  provided  in  the
penultimate  section  of  this  paper.
Given  these  considerations,  we  suggest  a shift  in  emphasis;
collective  models  of  household  behavior  should  be  regarded  as  the
standard  approach,  with  the  unitary  model  being  regarded  as  a  special
case. Below,  we  set  these  issues  out  in  more  detail.  Additional
discussion  of  the  points  we  raise,  with  further  references,  can  be
sound  in  Chiappori  (1992b);  Haddad,  Hoddinott,  and  Pena  (1992);
Hoddinott  (1992a);  and  McElroy  (1992).4  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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UNITARY  AND  COLLECTIVE  MODELS  OF  HOUSEHOLD  BEHAVIOR
The  Unitary  Model
The  standaru  approach  to iodelling  household  behavior  assumes  the
existence  of  a  household  welfare  function  that  aggregates  the
preferences  of  all  members.  Maximizing  this  function,  subject  to  the
appropriate  budget  constraint,  yields  demand  functions  for  goods,
broadly  defined,  and  leisure.  We  call  this  the  'unitary  m^del.'  This
model  is  sometimes  called  the  'common  preferen.-es'  model  or  the
'altruism'  model  or  the  'Benevolent  Dictator'  model.  We  call  it  the
unitary  model  because  this  label  describes  how  the  household  acts  (as
one). Other  labels  tend  to  reflect  the  manner  in  which  the  household
is  hypothesized  to  act  as  one. For  instance,  common  preferences  are
only  one  way  in  which  the  household  can  act  as  one;  spouse  abuse  is
another.  'Altruism'  has  also  been  used  to  explain  why  households
might  behave  as  one  individual,  but  as  we  shall  see  later,  it  is
altruism  unuer  very  restrictive  conditions.
The  existence  of  a  household  welfare  function  reflecting  the
preferences  of  all  members  is  by  no  means  an  innocuous  assumption;  its
compatibility  with  individualism  may  be  problematic.  Individual
household  members  are  likely  to  have  different  preferences.
Accordingly,  the  existence  of  a  household  welfare  function  requires
that  these  differing  preferences  be  aggregated.  The  vast  social
choice  literature  illustrates  the  theoretical  difficulties  associated
with  this. Also,  an  immediate  but  important  consequence  of  the
unitary  approach  is  the  pooling  of  all  household  resources  (capital,5  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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labor,  and  land).  From  an  individualistic  viewpoint,  the  pooling  of
all  resources  requires  that  at  least  one  household  member  has  the
ability  to  monitor  its  members  and  to  sanction  those  who  fall  foul  of
its  rules.
A strong  feature  of  the  unitary  model  is  its  ability  to  explain
two  aspects  of  household  behavior:  decisions  regarding  tne  quantity
of  goods  consumed  and  the  aliocation  of  those  goods  amongst  household
members.  For  example,  Pitt,  Rosenzweig,  and  Hassan  (1990)  extend  the
agricultural  household  model  by  incorporating  individual  work  effort
as  a  choice  variable  in  the  household  welfare  function.  They  suggest
that  unequal  calorie  allocations  across  gender  and  age  classes  may
reflect  different  distributions  of  activities  within  those  classes.
The  reasoning  is  that,  given  a  household  welfare  function,  (a)  if  men
are  more  likely  than  women  to  undertake  energy-intensive  activity,  and
(b)  if  productivity  (pecuniary  returns)  in  those  activities  is
responsive  to  health  and  effort,  it  makes  sense  for  the  household  to
allocate  marginal  calories  to  healthy  men. In  this  way,  the  marginal
utility  gained  by  the  household  from  allocating  calories  to  an
individual,  standardized  by  the  cost  to  the  household  of  allocating
calories  to  that  individual,  is  equalized  across  household  members
(first  order  conditions  for  household  welfare  maximization).  Pitt,
Rosenzweig,  and  Hassan  find  support  for  the  hypothesis  that
intrahousehold  food  allocation  reflects  the  different  energy-intensive
activities  undertaken  by  men  and  women.6  Unitary  Vkrsus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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However  the  existence  of  differentials  across  household  members
in  calorie  intakes  even after  standardizing  by  activity
patterns--does  not  necessarily  invalidate  the  unitary  model. These
inequalities  could  be  generated  by  different  perceptions  of  energy
intake  and  need  or  simply  because  the  household  decides  that  it
prefers  well-fed  men  to  well-fed  women. However,  a  number  of
commentators  have  found  it  difficult  to  reconcile  the  unitary  model
with  these  types  of  systematic  differences  in  welfare  within
households.  As  Fo7bre  (1986,  251)  comments:
The  suggestion  that  women  and  female  children  'voluntarily'
relinquish  leisure,  education,  and  food  would  be  somewhat
more  persuasive  if  they  were  in  a  position  to  demand  their
fair  share.  It  is  the  juxtaposition  of  women's  lack  of
economic  power  with  the  unequal  allocation  of  household
resources  that  lends  the  bargaining  power  approach  much  of
its  persuasive  appeal.
Collective  Models
Collective  models  take  as  given  the  individuality  of  household
members.  Ir,  the  existing  literature,  there  are  two  broad  types  of
collective  model:  cooperative  and  noncooperative.  As  we  shall  see
below,  the  unitary  model  can  be  seen  as  a  special  case  of  this  more
general  class  of  models.7  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of th Household:
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The  noncooperative  approach  (Ulph  1988;  Kanbur  1991;  Katz  1992;
Lundberg  and  Pollack  1992)  relies  on  the  assumption  that  individuals
cannot  enter  into  bi.,>ing  and  enforceable  contracts  with  each  other.
Instead,  individuals'  actions  are  conditional  on  the  actions  of
others.  For  example,  in  Katz's  'Reciprocal  Claims'  model,  the
househeld  is  "depicted  as  a  site  of  largely  separate  gender-specific
economies  linked  by  reciprocal  claims  on  members'  income,  land,  goods,
and  labor."  A  wife's  budget  is  delinked  from  her  hushands;  wives
respond  to  changes  in  their  husbands'  allocat,on  of  his  labor  solely
accecding  to  *heir  own  needs.
In  the  cooperative  approach,  individuals  have  a  choice  of
remaining  single  or  of  forming  a  household.  They  choose  the  latter
option  when  the  utility  levels  associated  with  being  married  outweigh
the  utility  aerived  from  being  s4ngle. For  example,  there  may  be
economies  of  scale  associated  with  the  production  of  certain  household
goods,  or  there  may  be  some  goods  that  can  be  produced  and  shared  by
married  couples  but  not  single  individuals.  Hou  ehold  formation  may
generate  intangible  benefits  such  as  'love'  or 'companionship.'  In
any  case,  the  existence  of  the  household  generates  a  surplus,  which
will  be  distributed  across  the  members;  of  course,  the  rule  governing
this  distribution  is  a  central  issue  of  the  analysis.
Starting  from  this  common  framework,  two  subclasses  of  models
have  emerged.  Models  of  the  firA category  only  suppose  that
household  decisions  are  always  efficient  in  the  (usual)  Pareto  sense.
In  particular,  nothing  is  assumed  a  priori  about  the  nature  of  the8  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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decision  process,  or,  equivalently,  about  the  location  of  the  final
outcome  on  the  household  Pareto  frontier.  This  does  not  mean  that  the
rule  of  repartition  governing  intrahousehold  allocation  is
nonessential,  but  rathev  that  it  has  to  be  estimated  from  t:,e  data
rather  than  postulated  a  priori.  This  more  general  viewpoint  is
especially  convenient  for  assessing  the  relative  relevance  of  ths
competing  frameworks.  In  particular,  an  important  finding  is  that  the
efficiency  hypothesis  is  sufficient  to  generate  strong  testable
restrictions  upon  household  behavior  (Chiappori  1992b).
Models  of  the  second  subclass  go  one  step  further-,  by
representing  household  decisions  as  the  outcome  of  some  bargaining
process,  and  applying  to  this  framework  the  tools  of  cooperative  game
theory.  Then  the  division  of  the  gains  from  marriage  can  be  modelled
as  a  function  of  the  'fallback,'  or  'threat  point'  position  of  each
member;  itself  a  function  of  extra-environmental  parameters  (EEPs).
These  include  sex  ratios  in  marriage  markets,  laws  concerning  alimony
and  child  support,  changes  in  tax  status  associated  with  different
marital  states,  and,  in  developing  countries,  the  ability  of  women  to
return  to  their  natal  homes  and  prohibitions  on  women  working  outside
the  home  (McElroy  1990,  1992).  The  vast  majority  of  'bargaining'
models  rely  on  a  Nash  solution.  This  is  justified  by  results  due  to
Binmore,  Rubinstein,  and  Wolinsky  (1986)  and  Harsanyi  and  Selten
(1988),  indicating  that  the  Nash  cooperative  solution  emerges  from  a9  UnitarV  Versus  Collective  Models  u ti9 Household:
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number  of  noncooperative  framewirks.1  Figure  1  presents  a
diagrammatic  taxonomv  of  collective  household  models.
There  are  several  general  aspects  of  the  co,lective  approach  that
are  wortn  further  comment.  It  would  be  desirable  if  the  outcome  of
intrahousehold  bargaining  was  pa,eto  optimal.  This  is  satisfied  by
definition  for  cooperative  models;  in  particular,  the  general
restrictions  alluded  to  above  also  apply  to  Nash  bargaining
frameworks.  However,  as  is  well  known,  efficiency  does  not  always
hold  in  the  case  of  noncooperative  models.  Second,  an  appealing
feature  of  the  rotten  kid  theorem  is  its  resolution  of  enforcement
problems.  In  bargaining  models,  this  can  be  resolved  via  the  threat
of  household  dissolution,  but  as  McElroy  (1992)  notes,  "in  the  context
of  small  daily  decisions,  it  is  not  credible  for  either  spouse  to
threaten  divorce."  McElroy  suggests  that  decisions  regarding
short-run  issues  can  be  motivated  by  time  preferences  as  in  work  by
Binmore,  Rubinstein,  and  Wolinsky  (1986).  Here,  the  noncooperative
solution  acts  as  the  threat  point.
CASTING  DOUBTS  ON  THE  UNITARY  MODEL-THEORY
We  now  turn  t  a  closer  examination  of  the  unitary  model.  As
indicated  above,  the  unitary  model  requires  the  aggregation  of
preferences  and  the  pooling  of  household  resources.
We  owe  these  references  to  McElroy  (1992).1  0  Unitary  Versus  Colbictive  Models  of the  Housahold:
Time  to Shift  the  Burd6n  of Proof?
Figure 1--Models of  the household
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At  the  household  level,  Samuelsun  (1956)  suggested  that  this
aggregation  could  be  achieved  via  a  consensus  amongst  members.
However,  this  does  not  indicate  how  such  a  consensus  is  reached.  Nor
does  it  explicitly  address  the  problems  of  monitoring  and  incentives.
An  alternative  approach  could  be  based  on  Sen's  (1966)  model  of
cooperatives.  Here,  family  welfare  is  the  weighted  sum  of  the  net
utility  of  all  members.  But  in  the  absence  of  a  dictator,  or
'symmetric  sympathy,'  it  is  unclear  how  these  weights  are  determined.
While  they  could  be  the  outcome  of  a  voting  scheme,  there  are  a  wide
range  of  circumstances  under  which  this  fails  to  generate  a  unique
ordering  of  preferences  (Sen  1986).  Another  weakness  of  this
justification  is  that  the  corresponding  aggregate  index  will  not  be
equivalent  to  a  utility  function,  unless  it  does  not  depend  on  prices
and  incomes.  Ruling  out  a  priori  any  effect  of  incomes  upon
intrahousehold  weights  is  a  very  strong  assumption,  difficult  to
justify  on  a  theoretical  basis.
The  strongest  justification  for  the  unitary  model  is  put  forward
by  Becker  (1974,  1981)  in  the  'rotten  kid  theorem.'  Becker  considers
the  case  of  a  household  with  two  members,  a  benefactor  and  a
recipient.  The  recipient  is  selfish  in  that  he/she  derives  utility
solely  from  his  own  consumption.  The  benefactor,  as  an  altruist,  can
increase  his/her  own  utility  by  transferring  some  of  his  own
consumption  to  that  of  the  recipient.  Now  suppose  the  recipient
undertakes  some  action  that  raises  his/her  own  consumption  but  lowers
that  of  the  benefactor.  The  benefactor  could  respond  by  lowering1  2  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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his/her  transfers  to  the  recipient,  so  much  so  that  the  recipient's
new  level  of  consumption  is  below  his/her  original  level.
Consequently,  the  recipient  will  not  behave  rottenly  in  the  first
place.
The  rotten  kid  theorem  resolves  the  problems  of  aggregation  and
enforcement.  The  preferences  of  the  altruist  become  the  preferences
of  the  household;  the  household's  maximand  becomes  the  utility
function  of  the  altruist.  However,  the  rotten  kid  theorem  only  holds
under  restrictive  circumstances:  (a)  the  recipient's  consumption  can
be  neither  an  inferior  nor  a  luxury  good--otherwise  the  threat  of
reduced  transfers  may  not  be  credible  over  all  levels  of  consumption;
(b)  any  attempt  to  disrupt  the  benefactor's  desired  distribution  of
consumption  is  'small.'  That  is,  a  kid  could  not  be  so  rotten  that  he
reduces  the  altruist's  consumption  below  his  initial  endowment  while
raising  his  own  above  its  previous  (endowment  plus  transfer)  level.
Not  only  must  the  resources  of  the  altruist  be  larger  than  any  one
individual,  they  must  also  be  larger  than  any  coalition  of  household
members.  If  this  was  not  the  case,  it  may  be  possible  for  a  group  of
individuals  to  behave  rottenly  together,  increasing  their  collective
consumption  at  the  expense  of  others.
King  Lear  and  the  importance  of  having  the  last  word  (Hirshleifer
1977),  the  Samaritan's  Dilemma  (Bernheim  and  Stark  1988;  Bruce  and
Waldman  1990),  and  lazy  rotten  kids  and  controversial  night-lights
(Bergstrom  1989)  are  further  examples  where  the  rotten  kid  theorem  is
violated.  In  these  cises,  the  introduction  of  a  second  commodity  (for13  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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example,  consumption  today  and  consumption  tomorrow)  makes  it
profitable  for  the  recipient  to  choose  an  action  that  enhances  his/her
utility  at  the  expense  of  the  benefactor.  Bergstrom  (1989)  has
generalized  these  results,  and  has  shown  that  the  rotten  kid  theorem
only  holds  where  the  preferences  of  every  household  member  can  be
represented  by  a  utility  function  yielding  transferable
utility-again,  a  very  strong  assumption.
CASTING  DOUBTS  ON  THE  UNITARY  MODEL-EVIDENCE
We  now  turn  to  a  brief  review  of  the  empirical  literature.  We
begin  with  the  'informal  evidence.'  This  material  is  not  necessarily
nested  within  a  formal  test  procedure,  but  nevertheless  casts  doubt
upon  certain  aspects  of  the  unitary  model.
Informal  Evidence
A  large  number  of  studies,  from  several  disciplines,  from  both
developed  and  developing  countries,  indicate  that  income  is  not  pooled
within  a  household.  Instead,  households  adopt  a  variety  of  income
sharing  arrangements  (Pahl  1983)-including  the  'whole  wage'  system
(one  person  manages  all  finances  and  expenditures  except  for  personal
spending  money);  the  'allowance'  or 'spheres  of  responsibility'  system
(for  example,  a  husband  gives  his  wife  a  set  amount  for  purchasing
specified  commodities);  the  'shared  management'  systern  (all  incomes
are  pooled);  and  the  'independent  management'  system  (each  individual
has  their  own  income  and  is  responsible  for  certain  expenditures,  and1  4  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of the  Household:
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neither  has  access  to  all  household  funds).  A  consequence,  though
perhaps  not  a  surprising  one,  is  that  differential  control  of income
translates  into  different  patterns  of  expenditures.  It  is  widely
perceived,  and  again  supported  Lj  a  mass  of  case  study  material,  that
relative  to  women,  men  spend  more  of  the  income  under  own-contro-I
their  own  consumption.  Alcohol,  cigarettes,  status  consumer  gooas
even  'female  companionship'  are  noted  in  these  studies.  By  contraA.
women  are  more  likely  to  purchase  goods  for  children  and  for  general
household  consumption.
Another  class  of  informal  evidence  relates  to  domestic  violence.
There  is  considerable  evidence  that  domestic  violence  is  prevalent  in
both  developed  and  developing  countries  (Heise  1992).  This  evidence
might  appear  tangential  to  issues  of  household  modelling,  but  we
believe  that  this  is  not  the  case. Altruism  is  a  necessary  component
of  the  rotten  kid  theorem  which,  as  discussed  above,  is  the  most
plausible  justification  for  the  unitary  household  model. The  fact
that  domestic  violen^e  is  widespread  calls  into  question  the  ubiquity
of  this  assumption.  Moreover,  domestic  violence  can  be  readily
incorporated  into  a  collective  model  of  household  behavior.
Is  this  informal  evidence  persuasive?  We  note  two  points.
First,  much  of  the  case  study  material  is  supported  by  econometric
analysis-see  Hoddinott  and  Haddad  (1991)  for  evidence  regarding  the
relationship  between  gender-specific  income  and  expenditures,  and
Tauchen,  Witte,  and  Long  (1991)  for  an  analysis  of  domestic  violence.
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validity  of  its  assumptions-these,  to  use  Rosenzweig's  (1986,  233)
phrase,  "do  violence  to  reality."  This  leaves  two  choices.  If  one
adopts  a  Samuelsonian  position  ("if  the  abstract  models  contain
empirical  falsities,  we  must  jettison  the  models,  not  gloss  over  their
inadequacies,"  [Samuelson  1963,  236])  the  unitary  model  cannot  be
regarded  as  anything  more  than  an  interesting  special  case.
Alternatively,  one  can  fall  back  on  a  Friedman-type  view: "a  theory
is  vindicable  if  its  consequences  are  empirically  valid  to  a  useful
degree  of  approximation;  the  (empirical)  unrealism  of  the  theory
'itself,'  or  its  'assumptions,'  is  quite  irrelevant  to  its  validity
and  worth"  (Samuelson  1963,  232). That  is,  the  unitary  model  should
be  judged  on  the  accuracy  of  its  predictions,  not  the  realism  of  its
assumptions.  We  now  turn  to  these.
Formal  Evidence
We  survey  two  kinds  of  'formal'  evidence.  On  the  one  hand,
several  restrictions  of  the  unitary  model  do  not  hold  when  tested
empirically.  Three  are  considered  here: cross-substitution  effects
on  labor  supply;  nonpooling  of  nonlabor  income;  and  strategic  behavior
in  the  context  of  intergenerational  relations.  On  the  other  hand,
comparative  tests  of  the  collective  and  unitary  approaches  seem  to
favor  the  former  framework.
In  the  context  of  labor  supply  decisions,  the  unitary  model
implies  that  cross  substitution  effects  must  be  equal-that  is,  "tne
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wife's  labor  supply  must  be  identical  to  the  effect  of  an
income-compensated  increase  in  the  wife's  wage  on  the  husband's  labor
supply"  (Lundberg  1988,  225).  Existing  evidence  from  the  United
States  (Ashenfelter  and  Heckman  1974)  rejects  the  equality  of  these
effects.  Further,  using  panel  data  to  control  for  unobserved  fixed
effects,  Lundberg  (1988)  rejects  the  hypothesis  that  husband's  and
wife's  labor  supply  are  jointly  determined,  as  predicted  by  the
unitary  model. 2
A key  assumption  of  the  unitary  model  is  the  pooling  of  household
income.  This  implies  that  the  identity  of  the  individual  earning  the
income  has  no  effect  on  the  household  demand  for  goods  and  leisure.
Direct  tests  uf  this  assumption  are  problematic  because  of  the
endogeneity  of  income.  Schultz  (1990)  and  Thomas  (1990,  1992)  avoid
this  difficulty  by  focusing  on  unearned  income.  As  Schultz  (1990,
601-602)  notes,
If  non-earned  income  (or  ownership  of  the  underlying  asset)
influences  family  demand  behavior  differently,  depending  on
who  in  the  family  controls  the  income  (or  owns  the  asset),
then  the  preferences  for  that  demand  must  differ  across
individuals  and  such  families  must  not  completely  pool
unearned  income.
2 More  generally,  the  symmetry  of  the  Slutsky  matrix  is  generally
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Thomas  (1992)  finds  that  increased  (nonlabor)  income  held  by  women
leads  to  a  greater  share  of  the  household  budget  devoted  to
expenditures  on  human  capital  and  a  higher  level  of  nutrient  intake.
In  the  context  of intergenerational  transfers,  the  unitary  model
implies  that  benefactors  have  no  incentive  to  behave
strategically-that  is,  to  manipulate  intentionally  the  behavior  of
the  recipient.  In  other  words,  rotten  kids  do  not  attempt  to  raise
their  consumption  at  the  expense  of  others,  because  the  altruistic
benefactor  will  automatically  reduce  the  size  of  the  transfers  made  to
them. This  hypothesis  is  testable.  If  Becker's  model  holds,  we
should  not  find  evidence  of  benefactors  behaving  strategically,  for
example,  using  bequests  to  obtain  attention  or  monetary  transfers  from
their  offspring.  Bernheim,  Shleifer,  and  Summers  (1985)  develop  a
noncooperative  bargaining  model  incorporating  this  possibility.  They
find  that  bequeathable  wealth  is  strongly  positively  correlated  with
attention,  as  measured  by  visits  and  telephone  calls. Lucas  and  Stark
(1985)  and  Hoddinott  (1992b)  obtain  comparable  results,  finding  that
increased  holdings  of  inheritable  assets  lead  to  higher  monetary
transfers  from  nonresident  members  in  Botswana  (Lucas  and  Stark)  and
from  sons  who  anticipate  receiving  an  inheritance  in  western  Kenya
(Hoddinott).
Lastly,  recent  work  has  emphasized  the  existence  of  empirical
tests  characterizing  the  'collective'  approach.  Chiappori  (1988,
1992a)  derives  restrictions  on  labor  supply  in  a  model  where
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estimate  a  general  model  of  labor  supply  in  which  both  the  "unitary"
and  the  collective  framework  can  be  tested  as  special  cases.  They
find  that,  while  the  unitary  restrictions  are  strongly  rejected,  the
collective  are  not.
In  the  case  of  general  demand  systems,  the  Slutsky  matrix  X, in
the  unitary  framework,  rliist  be  symmetric,  whereas  the  collective
approach  implies  that  E  can  be  written  as  the  sum  of  a symmetric  and
a  rank  one  matrices  (Browning  and  Chiappori  1992).  Also,  though
collective  models  are  compatible  with  the  absence  of  'income  pooling,'
as  discussed  above,  the  efficiency  assumption  strongly  restricts  the
way  in  which  different  income  sources  may  influence  consumption
patterns  (Boturguignon,  Browning,  and  Chiappori  1992).  A  preliminary
test  of  the  latter  restrictions  is  provided  by  Bourguignon  et  al.
(1992a,  1992b).  In  both  papers,  a  general  model  is  constructed  that
encompasses  both  the  unitary  and  the  collective  frameworks  as  special
cases.  While  the  unitary  restrictions  are  strongly  rejected  in  both
cases,  the  collective  ones  are  not. Even  more  interesting  is  the
comparison,  in  the  second  paper,  between  a sample  of  couples  and  two
subsamples  of  singles:  the  unitary  restrictions  are  rejected  for  the
former,  but  not  for  the  latter.
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  OF  RELYING  ON  THE  UNITARY  MODEL
Should  policymakers  simply  ignore  issues  relating  to
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unitary  and  collective  models  merely  an  arcane  academic  curiosity?  We
argue  that  the  answer  to  both  questions  is  no.
With  respect  to  the  first  question,  consider  the  following
example.  Suppose  there  is  concern  regarding  the  well-being  of  young
girls  in  a  particular  rural  area;  specifically,  there  is  a  perception
that  they  do  not  get  enough  food  to  eat. A  possible  policy  response
is  the  implementation  of  a  school  meals  program.  However,  the  success
of  this  intervention  cannot  be  ascertained  in  the  absence  of
information  on  how  households  allocate  food  amongst  their  members.
Households  might  respond  to  this  program  by  reducing  the  amount  of
food  girls  receive  at  home  (and  increasing  the  amount  of  food  consumed
by  other  household  members).  Understanding  how  households  alter  the
intrahousehold  allocation  of  resources  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  in
determining  the  effectiveness  of  such  policy  interventions  (Haddad  and
Kanbur  1992a).
A second  example  of  the  possible  policy  errors  induced  by
ignoring  intrahousehold  issues  is  the  measurement  of  poverty  and
inequality.  Consider  a  country  where  transfer  payments  are  made  from
a  central  government  to  provincial  or  state  authorities.  The  size  of
these  transfers  is  a  function  of  estimated  levels  of  poverty.  Does  it
matter  if  poverty  is  measured  with  reference  to  households  or  to
individuals?  If  resources  are  equally  distributed  amongst  members,
either  measure  will  yield  the  same  estimate  of  the  degree  of  poverty.
However,  as  Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1990)  demonstrate,  this  no  longer  holds
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individual-  and  household-level  data  on  caloric  availability  in  the
Philippines,  they  estimate  the  incidence  of  poverty  using  the  P(a)
class  of  poverty  measures  proposed  by  Foster,  Greer,  and  Thorbecke
(1984).  Using  an  income  gap  poverty  measure  (a=l),  they  find  that
ignoring  intrahousehold  inequality  understates  poverty  by  18-23
percent.  They  note  that  their  results  are  dependent  on  the  poverty
measure  used,  and  that  the  pattern  of  poverty  across  socioeconomic
groups.  However,  their  general  result,  that  measures  of  the  degree  of
poverty  are  sensitive  to  intrahousehold  inequality,  is  of  clear  policy
relevance. 3
A less  clear-cut  question  is  whether  the  analytical  complexity
associated  with  collective  models  of  household  behavior  offer  any
additional  insights  for  policymakers.  We  suggest  four  areas  where  the
choice  of  model  matters.  The  first  concerns  the  effect  of  public
transfers  made  to  the  household.  The  unitary  model  predicts  that  the
impact  of  such  transfers  is  unaffected  by  the  identity  of  the
recipient.  Second,  at  a  project  level,  the  unitary  model  implies  that
it  does  not  matter  to  whom  policy  initiatives  are  directed.  Given
information  sharing,  the  response  to  that  policy  will  be  recipient-
independent.  This  gives  rise  to  two  potential  policy  failures:  (i)
3  Becker  (1988)  considers  a  number  of  other  policy  issues,
including  growth  and  the  intergenerational  transmission  of  inequality,
where  an  understanding  of  the  intrahousehold  allocation  of  resources
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the  nonadoption  of  particular  policies;  and  (ii)  unintended  costs
arising  from  policies  that  are  adopted.  Below,  we  illustrate
nonadoption  and  unintended  policy  consequences  through  attempts  to
facilitate  the  adoption  of  new  technology  in  developing  countries.
(Other  areas  such  as  targeting  and  environmental  degradation  are
discussed  in  Haddad,  Hoddinott,  and  Pefia  [1992]).  Third,  the  unitary
model  depicts  as  impotent  a  number  of  policy  initiatives  which  neither
directly  affect  the  technology  of  Z-good  production  nor  affect
household  preferences.  Finally,  the  nature  of  interactions  between
household  members  will  determine  whether  public  transfers  are
mitigated  or  enhanced  by  changes  in  private  behavior.
As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  the  claim  that  household
decisions  are  independent  of  the  identity  of  the  individual  earning
income  has  been  refuted  in  a  number  of  settings.  This  has  obvious
implications  for  policy  as  illustrated  by  the  following  quotations:
Many  participants  in  the  public  debate  concerning
actual  government  transfers  take  it  for  granted  that
intrafamily  distribution  will  vary  systematically  with  the
control  of  resources.  When  the  British  child  allowance
system  was  changed  in  the  mid-1970s  to  make  child  benefits
payable  in  cash  to  the  mother,  it  was  widely  regarded  as  a
redistribution  of  family  income  from  men  to  women  and  was
expected  to  be  popular  with  women  (Lundberg  and  Pollack
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Indeed,  so  convinced  did  some  Ministers  become  that  a
transfer  of  income  'from  the  wallet  to  the  purse'  at  a  time
of  wage  restraint  would  be  resented  by  male  workers,  that
they  decided  at  one  point  in  1977  to  defer  the  whole  child
benefit  scheme  (Brown  1984,  cited  in  Lundberg  and  Pollack
1992).
There  are  a  number  of  examples  of  the  nonadoption  of  policies
designed  to  improve  crop  technology. 4 Jones  (1986),  summarized  in
Dey  (1992),  reports  the  results  of  a  project  in  Carreroon  to  encourage
women  to  produce  rice. In  the  study  area,  rice  was  considered  to  be  a
male  crop. Any  income  generated  from  it  would  have  been  controlled  by
men,  even  if  the  crop  was  produced  by  women.  Consequently,  few  women
entered  into  rice  cultivation.  Instead,  they  contir,ued  to  grow
sorghum,  despite  its  lower  returns,  because  they  controlled  the
harvested  product.
However,  targeting  an  initiative  to  the  correctly-identified  most
in-need  group  does  not  necessarily  diminish  the  probability  of  adverse
unintended  impacts.  An  example  of  this  second  type  of  resource
misallocation.-  unanticipated  impacts  of  the  adoption  of  a  new
technology-is  provided  by  the  work  of  von  Braun  and  Webb  (1989)  in
The  Gambia.  In  the  early  1980s,  rice  irrigation  was  introduced  to  an
area  of  swamp  rice  production  in  order  to  raise  yields,  commercialize
4  Also  see  Poats  (1991)  and  Gladwin  and  McMillan  (1989).23  Unhery  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household.
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the  product,  and  raise  women's  share  of  household  income.  However,  an
initiative  intended  to  raise  female  income  shares  ended  up  reducing
them. Previously,  women  were  the  rice  growers.  Yield  increases
transformed  the  status  of  rice  from  a  private  crop  under  the  control
of  women  into  a  'ommunal  crop  under  the  control  of  men. Prior
knowledge  of  the  relative  bargaining  positions  of  men  and  women  would
have  helped  predict  the  outcome  and  enabled  program  redesign  to  meet
the  original  goals. 5
The  third  policy  failure  induced  by  the  unitary  model  is  the
failure  to  predict  the  consequences  for  intrahousehold  resource
allocation  of  policy  measures  that  affect  neither  the  technology  of  Z-
good  production  nor  household  preferences.  An  example  of  this  issue
particularly  relevant  to  developing  countries  is  that  of  common
property  resource  (CPR)  management  schemes,  such  as  access  to  common
grazing  land. 6
5  Dey  (1992)  reports  that  more  recent  attempts  by  donors  funding
this  project  to  safeguard  women's  access  to  land  were  frustrated  by
the  manager's  of  the  project,  who  sided  with  male  household  heads  in
disputes  over  access  to  land. Attention  to  intrahousehold
considerations  is  necessary  to  avoid  such  unforeseen  policy  failures,
but  as  this  example  makes  clear,  it  may  not  be  sufficient.
6  This  example  also  applies  to  changes  in  laws  concerning  alimony
and  child  support,  the  ability  of  women  to  return  to  their  natal
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Haddad  and  Kanbur  (1992b)  outline  the  following  model.  Within  a
household,  there  are  two  individuals,  each  with  access  to  a  production
function  that  produces  output  as  the  result  of  two  task  inputs.  There
is  comparative  advantage  in  the  tasks,  so  it  pays  to  cooperate  and
specialize  in  tasks.  But  how  are  the  gains  from  cooperation  to  be
divided?  Suppose  that  the  fallback  option  for  each  individual  is
identif;ad  with  the  outcome  of  working  alone.  Now,  suppose  that  the
government  irtroduces  a  scheme  that  guarantees  better  access  for  all
to  common  prop.  'ty  resources.  How  will  this  affect  intrahousehold
inequality,  and,  in  particular,  the  well-being  of  the  individual  with
poorer  pre-intervention  access? If  the  income  generated  from  improved
access  is  higher  than  what  the  women  could  previously  earn  on  their
own,  but  is  still  less  than  the  income  from  cooperation,  then  even
though  the  common  property  is  not  actually  used,  more  equitable  access
actually  improves  intrahousehold  equality.  What  is  remarkable  is  that
the  scheme  has  a  long  reach--it  equalizes  intrahousehold  allocation  by
altering  outside  options,  despite  those  options  not  being  taken  up.
Of  course,  the  credibility  of  the  guaranteed  access  is  at  the
heart  of  the  matter,  and  thi-  brings  the  issue  back  to  some  of  the
policy  debates  on  the  extent  of  access  to  CPRs. If  rationing  limits
the  ability  of  women  to  raise  their  fallback  utility,  then  there  will
not  be  an  impact  on  intrahousehold  allocation.  Other  intrahousehold
allocation  issues  also  come  into  play-if  improved  access  is  only
guaranteed  for  married  women,  the  threat  points  outside  the  marriage
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women  outside  as  well  as  inside  marriage  will  result  in  CPR  reforms
which  are  better  able  to  improve  intrahousehold  resource  allocation.
In  the  initial  discussion  of  policy  issues,  we  noted  that  changes
in  private  behavior  may  offset  public  transfers.  In  models  such  as
Barro  (1974),  altruism  on  the  part  of  private  agents  undoes  the  effect
of  government  policies  which  increase  the  incomes  of  the  current
generation  at  the  expense  of  future  generations.  If  intergenerational
altruism  is  replaced  with  exchange  motives,  this  result  no  longer
holds. In  a  developing  country  context,  the  following,  somewhat
contrived  example  (adapted  from  Cox  and  Jimenez  [1990])  illustrates
this  feature.  Consider  a  hypothetical  family  with  young  members
residing  in  towns  and  old  members  living  in  rural  areas.  Transfers
are  made  by  the  altruist  'young'  to  the  old,  and  individual
consumptiorn  is  a  function  of  aggregate  income.  Suppose  a social
security  program  is  introduced  that  taxes  the  young  and  subsidizes  the
old,  leaving  aggregate  income  unchanged.  This  might  well  lead  to  a
reduction  in  urban-rural  remittances,  with  consumption  of  individual
members  unchanged.  However,  suppose  that  these  young-to-old  transfers
are  undertaken  in  exchange  for  some  in-kind  service  (such  as  looking
after  cattle).  The  transfer  would  be  an  amount  equal  to  what  the
recipient  would  have  received  working  as  a  casual  laborer.  An  urban
wage  tax  (the  social  security  program)  is  introduced,  with  the
proceeds  used  to  subsidize  rural  wages.  As  a  result,  the  urban
household  members  must  transfer  higher  amounts  to  their  elders  because
the  opportunity  cost  of  looking  after  the  cattle  has  increased.  This26  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of the  Household:
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is  the  opposite  result  of  that  predicted  by  the  altruistic  unitary
model.
CAVEATS  TO  COLLECTIVr  MODELS
Collective  models  of  household  behavior  have  four  strengths:
they  address  the  issue  of  preference  aggregation;  they  have
empirically  distinguishable  predictions;  they  highlight  important
policy  considerations;  and  they  are  supported  by  a  diverse  set  of
empirical  tests.  However,  there  are  several  caveats  worth  noting.
First,  caution  is  required  in  interpreting  a  number  of  results
supporting  collective  models  of  household  behavior:
1.  Browning  and  Chiappori  (1992)  test  a  pareto  efficient  model  using
Canadian  family  expenditure  data. Specifically,  they  focus  on
purchases  made  by  singles  and  childless  couples  in  full-time
employment.  There  may  be  selectivity  problems  with  such  samples.
Standard  approaches  to  dealing  with  this  are  problematic  oecause
of  the  difficulty  of  finding  variables  that  determine  the
likelihood  that  individuals  form  certain  types  of  households  but
do  not  affect  other  household  decisions.  (A  similar  criticism
applies  to  Hoddinott  and  Haddad's  (1991)  comparison  of
expenditure  patterns  of  all  adult  male  and  all  adult  female
households  in  the  Cote  d'Ivoire.)
2.  The  papers  by  Schultz  (1990)  and  Thomas  (1990,  1992)  use  non-
labor  income  to  test  the  income  pooling  hypothesis.  Two
objections  to  this  approach  can  be  made. First,  non-labor  income27  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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may  reflect  unobserved  productivity  heterogeneity. 7 Second,  the
reporting  of  non-labor  income  is  particularly  prone  to  reporting
and  measurement  error,  with  all  the  usual  consequences  for
econometric  testing.
3.  Extra-environmental  parameters  represent  a  means  of  testing
cooperative  theories  against  the  unitary  model,  and
distinguishing  between  cooperative  and  noncooperative  approaches
(Lundberg  and  Pollack  1992).  However,  these  are  unlikely  to  vary
much  in  cross-section  data,  and  where  such  variation  exists,
unobserved  differences  in  community  characteristics  may  be  a
legitimate  explanation  of  any  significant  effects;  and
4.  Collective  models  of  intergenerational  relations  (such  as
Bernheim,  Shleifer,  and  Summers  [1985]  and  Hoddinott  [1992b])
assume  that  the  number  of  children,  their  education,  and  earnings
are  exogenous Yet  as  the  literature  summarized  in  Behrman
(1992)  makes  abundantly  clear,  child  quality  and  quantity  is  the
outcome  of  parental  decisionmaking,  a  feature  ignored  in
empirical  tests  of  these  models.
7  Deaton  (1992)  notes  that  empirical  studies  of  labor  supply  in
the  early  1970s  found  a  positive  relationship  between  non-labor  income
and  hours  worked,  although  basic  micro  theory  predicts  the  opposite
effect.  One  explanation  is  that  harder  working  people  may  '-  more
productive  and,  hence,  better  able  to  acquire  assets  and  non-labor
income.28  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of the  Household:
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Second,  the  comparative  statics  of  most  collective  models  take
the  operations  of  the  marriage  market  as  exogenously  determined.
Relaxing  this  assumption  alters  the  impact  of  policy  changes  on
household  behavior.  Lundberg  and  Pollack  (1992)  consider  the  impact
of  payment  of  child  allowances  to  women. Using  a  cooperative  model,
they  show  that  such  a  scheme  will  initially  improve  the  intrahousehold
distribution  of  resources  in  favor  of  women. But  suppose  that
household  formation  is  preceded  by  some  form  of  binding  agreement
(such  as  a  prenuptial  contract)  which  includes  the  promise  of
transfers  from  husband  to  wife. Once  the  new  child  allowance  scheme
is  in  place,  one  might  expect  that  husbands  would  reduce  there
transfers.  As  Lundberg  and  Pollack  (1992,  21)  note,
with  binding  transfers,  the  distributional  effect  of  a
policy  changing  the  recipient  of  child  allowances  will,
therefore,  persist  only  within  marriages  in  existence  at  the
time  of  the  policy  change.  For  subsequent  generations  of
marriages,  adjustments  in  prenuptial  transfers  will  exactly
offset  the  shift  in  child  allowances.
Finally,  Sen  (1985)  notes  that  bargaining  amongst  members  is  also
a  function  of  their  perceived  contribution  to  the  household.  The
individual  perceived  as  making  the  larger  contribution  can  expect  to
obtain  an  outcome  more  favorable  to  him  or  her. This  may  place  women
at  a  particular  disadvantage,  as  much  of  their  contribution  may  take29  Unit7ry  Versus  Collective  Models  of  the  Household:
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the  form  of  nonmarket  labor,  which  is  less  visible  than  wage
employment.  The  distinction  between  actual  and  perceived  behavior  is
rarely  made  in  collective  models  of  household  behavior.  Woolley
(1992)  is  a recent  exception.
CONCLUSIONS
In  this  paper,  we  have  argued  that  economists  should  regard
households  as  'collective'  rather  than  'unitary'  entities.  We  have
argued  that  the  theoretical  foundations  of  the  unitary  model  are  weak;
that  its  underlying  assumptions  are  of  questionable  validity;  that  it
has  not  stood  up  well  to  empirical  testing;  and  that  it  ignores  or
obscures  important  policy  issues.  Though  caution  is  warranted  in
interpreting  the  evidence  that  has  accumulated  over  the  past  decade,
there  is  a  strong  argument  for  setting  the  collective  model  as  the
industry  standard.  In  making  this  claim,  our  intention  is  not  to
discard  the  unitary  model  in  its  entirety.  Rather,  we  argue  that  it
should  be  regarded  as  a  special  subset  of  the  collective  approach,
suitable  when  certain  specified  conditions  hold. The  burden  of  proof
should  shift  onto  those  who  would  claim  that  the  unitary  model  is  the
rule  and  collective  models,  the  exception.
Implicit  in  our  argument  is  a  view  that  household  economics  has
not  taken  Becker  (1965)  seriously  enough.  In  1965,  Becker  wrote,  "A
household  is  truly  a 'small  factory':  it  combines  capital  goods,  raw
ma^trials,  and  'abor  'o  11edri,  feed,  procreate,  and  otherwise  produce
useful  commodities."  We,  too,  perceive  the  household  as  a factory;30  Unitary  Versus  Collective  Models  of the  Household:
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but  like  all  factories,  it  consists  of  individuals  who--motivated  at
times  by  altruism,  at  times  by  self-interest,  and  often  by
both,-cajole,  cooperate,  threaten,  help,  argue,  support,  and,  indeed,
occasionally  walk  out  on  each  other.  Labor  economists  and  industrial
organization  theorists  have  long  exploited  the  value  of  going  inside
the  'black  box'  of  the  factory.  It  is  time  those  of  us  interesEd  in
household  economics  did  the  same.REFERENCES
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